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The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Corporations:
North Carolina Holds the Line
Most automobile liability insurance policies provide that the insurer will
settle or defend, as it considers appropriate, any claim for damages covered
under the terms of the policy and will pay all defense costs.' When an action is
brought against the insured, the insurer's duty to defend becomes absolute.2
Historically, insurance companies have employed independent attorneys ("local
counsel") 3 to represent insureds.4 More recently, insurers have used "house
counsel" 5 to defend insureds and to prosecute subrogation claims 6 as a way to
reduce costs. 7 A great majority of states now permit this use of house counselA
1. Hirsch, Insurer's Duty to Defend, 1978 DEF. RES. INsT. 7, 7-8.
2. See Strickland v. Hughes, 273 N.C. 481, 160 S.E.2d 313 (1968); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 358, 152 S.E.2d 513 (1966). The cost of
defense is not necessarily limited by the policy limits. Record at 3, Gardner v. North Carolina State
Bar, 316 N.C. 285, 341 S.E.2d 517 (1986) (No. 8410SC1265).
3. This Note uses the term "local counsel" to designate an attorney who is not an employee of
an insurance company and who is hired to defend an insured or prosecute a subrogation claim. The
term "independent counsel" is increasingly used to mean an attorney who is chosen by the insured
and subsequently reimbursed by the insurer. See Mallen, A New Definition of Insurance Defense
Counsel, 53 INS. COUNS. J. 108 (1986).
4. Id.
5. "House Counsel" means a licensed attorney who is a full-time, salaried employee of an
insurance company. See Gardner v. North Carolina State Bar, 316 N.C. 285, 286, 341 S.E.2d 517,
518 (1986).
6. An insurer that pays a claim against its insured for damages caused by the wrongdoing of a
third party is entitled to "step into the shoes" of the insured and assert the insured's rights against
the third party in order to recover on the claims that it has satisfied. In prosecuting a subrogation
claim, an insurer acquires no greater right than the insured would have had. The right of subroga-
tion exists whether or not explicitly stated in the policy. 8B J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSUR-
ANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4941 (1981).
7. See Mallen, supra note 3, at 110. "The initial savings is the elimination of the profit margin
of outside counsel. Efficiency and expertise can be achieved because of the ability to train staff
counsel in the particular liability lines written by the insurer." Id. at 110.
An added support for Mallen's observation is the result of an extensive study conducted by a
large North Carolina insurance firm on the cost effectiveness of house counsel in some of the states
east of the Mississippi River. The study showed, on an overall basis, that use of house counsel is cost
effective and can result in an estimated savings of up to 50%. However, this is an average. The
greater savings are in the larger metropolitan areas where attorney fees tend to be higher and where
each house counsel can handle a larger volume of cases. In determining cost effectiveness, some of
the factors considered were the size of the area to be serviced, the length of time cases await trial,
whether local counsel charge on a periodic basis or when the cases are closed, and the average cost
charged for the type of case house counsel can handle. The study also showed that on similar type
cases, the amount of time spent, the type of work done, and the quality of work performed were
consistent between house counsel and outside counsel.
8. Appellee's Brief at 25, Gardner v. North Carolina State Bar, 316 N.C. 285, 341 S.E.2d 517
(1986) (No. 8410SC1265). The appellee, Gardner, stated as follows: "From a thorough examination
of authorities, it appears that no state, with the possible exception of Kentucky, has held such repre-
sentation to be unethical or improper." Id. In its judgment, the superior court agreed with appellees
stating: "The clear weight of authority outside of this state based both on court rulings and State
Bar considerations support the position of the Petitioner [Gardner] that it is not unethical for House
Counsel to appear in representation of an insurance company's insureds ...." Record at 38; see,
e.g., In re Rules Governing the Conduct of Attorneys in Florida, 220 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1969) (Florida
Supreme Court rejected proposed Florida Bar rule that an attorney employed in master-servant
relationship shall not render legal services on behalf of customers); Coscia v. Cunningham, 250 Ga.
521, 523, 299 S.E.2d 880, 882 (1983) (insurer furnished house counsel to defend insured in automo-
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In Gardner v. North Carolina State Bar9 the North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld an ethics opinion of the North Carolina State Bar10 which deter-
mined that an attorney who is a full time employee of an insurance company
may not represent an insured as the counsel of record." This decision repre-
sents the first time the court has reviewed a State Bar ethics opinion.1 2 Endors-
ing the opinion, the court found that representation of an insured by an
employee who is a licensed attorney would constitute the unauthorized practice
of law by the insurance company.1 3 This Note questions the ruling in Gardner,
focusing particularly on the realities of the "tripartite relationship" 14 between
attorney, insured, and insurer. In addition, the Note suggests that the Gardner
court failed to examine the substantive issue presented by this challenge to the
Bar's position-whether an attorney's status as employee of an insurer (house
counsel) would render the attorney less capable than local counsel of handling
the ethical problems that are endemic to insurance defense. The Note examines
this issue by focusing on two ethical problems that exemplify the many concerns
surrounding insurance defense-conflict of interest issues and issues of
confidentiality.
On January 13, 1982, Nationwide Insurance Company and Robert R.
Gardner15 petitioned the North Carolina State Bar ("the Bar") for reconsidera-
tion of two of its previously adopted ethics opinions,' 6 Ethics Opinion No. 682
("Opinion 682") 17 and Code of Professional Responsibility Opinion 19 ("CPR
bile liability action; this practice is within the meaning of the statute, which provides that corpora-
tions are not prohibited from employing attorneys "in or about their own, immediate affairs");
Virginia State Bar Unauthorized Practice of Law, Op. 60 (1985); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
para. 415, § 5 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1986) (corporation may employ attorney in any litigation in
which corporation may be interested by reason of the issuance of a policy of insurance).
9. 316 N.C. 285, 341 S.E.2d 517 (1986).
10. N.C. Code of Professional Responsibility Op. 326 (1986). N.C. Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility Op. 326 ("CPR 326") was a reaffirmation of two earlier Code of Professional Responsi-
bility Opinions. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
11. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 288, 341 S.E.2d at 519.
12. Supreme Court Affirms CPR 326 Prohibiting Insurance Companies From Using House
Counsel to Defend Insureds, 11 N.C. ST. B. NEWSL., Spring 1986, at 1.
13. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 294, 341 S.E.2d at 523.
14. R. MALLEN & V. LEvrrT, LEGAL MALPRACrICE § 262 (1977).
15. Gardner, an attorney licensed to practice law in North Carolina, was employed as house
counsel by Nationwide Insurance Company. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 286 n.1, 341 S.E.2d at 518 n.l.
16. Id. at 286, 341 S.E.2d at 518. Petitioners also asked the Bar to reconsider N.C. Code of
Professional Responsibility Op. 624 (1986) ("CPR 624"), which prohibits a title company from em-
ploying a full-time, licensed attorney for title searching and real estate transactions. Record at 8.
The supreme court did not mention CPR 624.
17. Ethics Opinion 682 provides in part:
Is it improper and unethical for a member of the North Carolina State Bar who is
employed full time by "A" as "house counsel" to represent the insured in active trial litiga-
tion in connection with claims arising out of automobile accidents?
Opinion. Yes.
(A) An insurance company would be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
in violation of G.S. 84-2.1, G.S. 84-4 and G.S. 84-5 by employing "house counsel" to
represent insureds in active trial litigation in connection with claims arising out of automo-
bile accidents. Also see Ethics Opinion 624.
(B) Since a corporation cannot practice law directly, it cannot do so indirectly by
employing lawyers to practice for it. Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, Inc., 209 N.C. 624.
N.C. State Bar Comm. on Ethics, Op. 682 (1969).
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19"). 18 These opinions generally provide that it would be unethical for the
house counsel of an insurance company to defend that company's insureds as
counsel of record in claims arising out of the insured's policy.19 The Ethics
Committee of the Bar responded to this request for reconsideration by issuing
Proposed Code of Professional Responsibility Opinion 326 ("CPR 326") on Oc-
tober 21, 1982.20 This Ethics Committee proposal, affirming Ethics Opinion 682
and CPR 19, was adopted by the Bar Council 21 on January 14, 1983.22
On February 11, 1983, Gardner and Nationwide filed a petition seeking
judicial review of CPR 326 in the Wake County Superior Court,23 requesting
that the court declare CPR 326 void.24 The superior court struck down CPR
32625 and declared that it would be "lawful for full time salaried employees of
an insurance company who are attorneys licensed to practice in the State of
North Carolina ... to appear as counsel of record in actions brought against
insureds."' 26 In striking down the Bar's decision, the trial judge concluded that
"the distinction made by the Bar between 'house' and 'outside independent'
counsel was an arbitrary distinction and therefore unlawful."'27
18. CPR 19 provides in part:
The [subrogation] claim is single and indivisible. Where the insurance company pays only
a portion of the loss, the insured is a necessary party plaintiff in any action against the third
party tort-feasor. The insured may recover judgment for the full amount of the loss, and
the insured holds the proceeds of the judgment as trustee for the benefit of the insurance
company to the extent of the insurance paid by it. The third party tort-feasor has the right
to have the amount of his liability determined in a single action. Therefore, the salaried
lawyer of an insurance company would be representing the insured on the record and in
fact. In effect, therefore, the insurance company would be practicing law through its sala-
ried lawyer. An insurance company cannot practice law. Therefore, it would be unethical
for the salaried lawyer of the insurance company to handle the subrogation claim or a
possible suit arising out of the claim. See Opinions 682 (1969) and 624 (1968).
N.C. Code of Professional Responsibility Op. 19 (1974).
19. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 286, 341 S.E.2d at 518.
20. Record at 32-33; see infra note 76 (partial textual reference to N.C. CPR 326).
21. The North Carolina General Assembly created the North Carolina State Bar as an agency
of the State. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-15 (1985). The Bar Council is the governing body of the Bar
and is composed of fifty appointed or elected councilors. Id. § 84-17. This Council is vested with
"the control of the discipline, disbarment and restoration of attorneys practicing law in this State."
Id. § 84-23. Additionally, the Council is empowered to "formulate and adopt rules of professional
ethics and conduct." Id.
This statutory grant of power to the Bar does not abridge the inherent power of the North
Carolina Supreme Court to discipline attorneys. See id. § 84-36. The court and the Bar have "co-
equal and co-extensive" powers. Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 109, 250 S.E.2d 279, 299
(1978), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 740, 254 S.E.2d 181 (1979).
22. Record at 33.
23. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 286, 341 S.E.2d at 518. The petition was filed pursuant to N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 150A-45 (1983) (provision for judicial review of a declaratory ruling of a state agency under
the Administrative Procedure Act), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-45 (1986). Gardner, 316
N.C. at 287, 341 S.E.2d at 518. Plaintiffs Gardner and Nationwide argued that because the Bar is a
state agency they were entitled to judicial review of the Bar's decision by a superior court as outlined
by the Administrative Procedure Act. See id. at 286, 341 S.E.2d at 518-19.
24. Record at 1-3.
25. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 287, 341 S.E.2d at 518.
26. Record at 39.
27. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 287, 341 S.E.2d at 518. In declaring the distinction between house
and local counsel arbitrary, the trial court found that "[t]he clear weight of authority outside of this
State based both on Court rulings and State Bar considerations support the position of the Petitioner
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On appeal28 the Bar advanced two arguments in support of CPR 326.
First, it maintained that the legal representation of insureds by salaried, full-time
employees who are licensed to practice law in North Carolina would violate
North Carolina General Statutes section 84-5, which prohibits the unauthorized
practice of law by a corporation.29 The Bar contended that the insurer and
insured do not share a common interest and, therefore, the representation of an
insured amounts to representing "another person."' 30 Because the insurance
company acts through an employee when it represents another person in court,
the Bar maintained that the company violates the general prohibition against a
corporation practicing law or appearing as an attorney for any person in any
state court. 3 1 Second, the Bar asserted that "the proposed practice would result
in an increased risk of conflicts of interest."'32 These conflicts of interest are
"endemic" to the relationship between the insurer and the insured and justify a
prophylactic rule prohibiting the insurer from representing insureds through
employees. 33
Nationwide and Gardner advanced three arguments34 in support of the
trial court's finding.35 First, because of the nature of the contract between the
insured and insurer,36 the insurance company is simply "acting in furtherance of
its business" when it employs counsel to defend suits under liability policies and
that it is not unethical for House Counsel to appear in representation of an insurance company's
insured ...." Record at 38.
28. The Bar was granted leave to appeal directly to the supreme court. Gardner, 316 N.C. at
287, 341 S.E.2d at 318.
29. Appellant's Brief at 4, Gardner; see 316 N.C. 285, 341 S.E.2d 517 (1986); see infra notes 61-
75 and accompanying text (discussing the general prohibition against the practice of law by corpora-
tions announced in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-5 (1985)).
30. Appellant's Brief at 5-6.
31. Id. at 7. The Bar contended that the employee's status as a licensed attorney would not
prevent a finding that the corporation engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. In fact, the
attorney's participation in the proposed arrangement would constitute unethical conduct in violation
of N.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 3-103(A) (1981), which forbids a lawyer
from assisting a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.
32. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 289, 341 S.E.2d at 519. The Bar acknowledged that conflict of inter-
est problems between insured and insurer occur regardless of whether the attorney is local counsel or
house counsel. See Appellant's Brief at 16-18. The areas of potential conflict include "liability eval-
uation, compulsory counterclaims, economics of the defense, policy coverage and confidentiality," as
well as "qualitative factors" (avoidance of the emotional trauma of a trial, maintenance of reputa-
tion, or maintenance of an "unsullied" driving record). Id. at 16-17. Although these conflicts also
may arise when local counsel represents the insured, the Bar argued that the participation of house
counsel in the representation of insureds would involve house counsel in "situations fraught with
unethical conflicts of interest between their corporate employers and the insureds." Id. at 16, 30.
The Bar surmised that house counsel could not handle these conflicts as well as local counsel because
house counsel could not exercise the independent judgment needed to identify and manage these
conflicts. Id. at 16, 18.
33. Id. at 16; see infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
34. Petitioners also contended that CPR 326 violated Robert Gardner's individual rights under
the North Carolina Constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
because it prevented Gardner "from practicing law by denying him the right to appear before a
court." Gardner, 316 N.C. at 295, 341 S.E.2d at 523. The supreme court dismissed this argument
by stating that Gardner had chosen to contract his entire time with Nationwide. Id. Discussion of
the constitutional implications of the court's decision is beyond the scope of this Note.
35. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
36. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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to prosecute claims under collision policies.37 Second, pointing to the universal
practice of insurance companies' payment of local counsel to litigate claims, 38
Nationwide and Gardner argued that no reasonable distinction exists between
"the employment of house counsel and the employment of local counsel by the
insurance company."'39 Third, Nationwide and Gardner argued that any poten-
tial conflicts of interest 4 would develop whether the insurer employed house
counsel or local counsel.41 Furthermore, because all attorneys are bound by the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the house counsel will serve the insureds
just as effectively as local counsel. 42
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Frye, the North Carolina
Supreme Court accepted the Bar's position and held that Nationwide's "pro-
posed practice of allowing employees, in the course and scope of their employ-
ment, to represent insureds would constitute the unauthorized practice of law as
defined by N.C.G.S. § 84-5." 4 3 The court's analysis involved two inquiries: (1)
whether the corporation would be the actor in the proposed practice and (2)
whether the statute would prohibit an appearance"4 by such a corporation.45
The supreme court held that because house counsel is an agent of the insurance
company, the company, not the house counsel, would be the actor practicing
law under Nationwide's plan.46 Furthermore, because the insurance company
37. Appellee's Brief at 14. Nationwide and Gardner argued that the furnishing of defense is not
a substantial part of the contract with insureds. This defense is only incidental to Nationwide's
obligation under the policy to insure the policy holders. Id. at 6-7.
38. Id. at 7.
39. Id. at 10, 14-15; see also Gardner, 316 N.C. at 292, 341 S.E.2d at 521 (petitioners arguing
that the court failed to distinguish between house and local counsel in State ex rel. Seawell v. Caro-
lina Motor Club, 209 N.C. 624, 184 S.E.2d 540 (1936), and has permitted use of local counsel).
40. The Bar argued that potential conflicts of interest necessarily arise when house counsel
represents the insurer's insureds. See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
41. Appellees Brief at 28. Appellees noted that when an insurance company consistently hires
a local counsel for thirty years, as Nationwide had, an allegiance develops between local counsel and
the insurance company. Id.
42. Id.
43. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 294, 341 S.E.2d at 523. The court used a statutory analysis to reverse
the superior court ruling. The court failed to reach the conflicts of interest issue. Id. at 295, 341
S.E.2d at 523. Furthermore, the supreme court declined to rule on the Administrative Procedures
Act's general applicability to the Bar and the decisions of its Council. Instead, the court based its
jurisdiction in Gardner on "the court's inherent power to deal with its attorneys." Id. at 287, 341
S,E.2d at 519.
44. As used in this Note, the term "appearance" or "to appear" refers to the representation of
insureds by a licensed attorney who is the counsel of record in an action brought by a third party
against the insured or in a subrogation claim.
45. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 289-90, 341 S.E.2d at 520.
46. Id. at 290, 341 S.E.2d at 520. The court based this finding on State v. Pledger, 257 N.C.
634, 127 S.E.2d 337 (1962). Gardner, 316 N.C. at 289-90, 341 S.E.2d at 520. The Pledger court
reasoned as follows:
A corporation can act only through its officers, agents and employees. A person who, in
the course of his employment by a corporation, prepares a legal document in connection
with a business transaction in which the corporation has a primary interest... does not
violate the [unauthorized practice] statute, for his act in so doing is the act of the corpora-
tion in the furtherance of its own business.
Pledger, 257 N.C. at 637-38, 127 S.E.2d at 339.40; accord Title Guarantee Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n,
135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d 1011 (1957) (attorney preparing documents does so as agent of the corpora-
tion; attorney's acts are acts of the corporation); see also infra text accompanying notes 71-75 (de-
tailed discussion of Pledger).
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would appear on behalf of a "person, ' '47 "this appearance [would fall] within the
ban of N.C.G.S. § 84-5." 48 In addition to this statutory analysis, the court sup-
ported its decision with policy considerations derived from an interpretation of
state law "according to the policies expressed by [the] legislature and the best
interests of [the] state."4 9
To understand the Gardner decision thoroughly, it is necessary to examine
its statutory and historical context. The unauthorized practice of law is a legal
concept comprised of fragmentary bits of doctrine with only an "underdevel-
oped" and "sketchy" body of abstract legal concepts.50 Most statutory enact-
ments and court decisions in the United States concerning the unauthorized
practice of law occurred during the period 1914 to 1977. During this period the
legal profession mounted its most vigorous campaign against the so-called unau-
thorized practice of law, resulting in the passage of statutes against it.51
"Although many of these statutes were clear and unambiguous, their broad
wording gave the courts ample leeway to determine on a case-by-case basis what
practice was unauthorized."152 In most cases in which individual defendants en-
gaged in activities that the legal profession claimed were reserved for lawyers,
the stated goal of the courts in finding a particular activity subject to the unau-
thorized practice statute was the protection of the public from unqualified per-
sons over whom judges could exert no control. 53
During this same period, however, the profession became less concerned
with individuals engaged in unauthorized practice and more intent on shifting
its campaign to combat practice by corporations and lawyers employed by those
47. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 291, 341 S.E.2d at 521. The court rejected petitioner's argument,
which cited State v. Pledger, 257 N.C. 634, 127 S.E.2d 337 (1962), to support the proposition that
because an insured's and insurer's interests coincide, the insurance company can represent through
an employee what is essentially its own "primary interests." Gardner, 316 N.C. at 291, 341 S.E.2d at
521.
48. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 291, 341 S.E.2d at 521.
49. Id. at 293, 341 S.E.2d at 522. The court observed that North Carolina has a strong policy
of personal representation as evidenced by the legislature's insistence that certain functions which
other states permit corporations to perform be carried out by independent attorneys. Id.; see, eg.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-132(a) (1982) (title certification).
50. Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERs AND THEIR WORK 168 (1967). To determine the
scope of what the authors term the "legal monopoly," "heavy reliance must be placed on specific
factual examples of what is and is not the illegal practice of law." Id.
51. Note, Assisting the Pro Se Litigant: Unauthorized Practice of Law or the Fulfillment of a
Public Need?, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 691, 701 (1983). Lawyers became increasingly concerned
about the "unauthorized practice problem" as corporations became involved "in many areas tradi-
tionally considered reserved to lawyers." Id. For a detailed historical discussion of unauthorized
practice, see id. at 694-706.
52. Id. at 701-02; see, eg., State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 147 Neb. 527, 23 N.W.2d 720 (1946).
In these opinions, many courts determined what constitutes the practice of law by asking "whether
the activity, if undertaken by laymen will harm the public." Note, Control of the Unauthorized
Practice of Law: Scope of Inherent Judicial Power, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 162, 166 (1960).
53. Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 50, at 173; see, eg., West Virginia State Bar v.
Earley, 144 W.Va. 504, 527, 109 S.E.2d 420, 435 (1959). Johnstone and Hopson observe, however,
that court decisions generally have failed to explore and articulate "the goals they are working to-
wards in allocating functions to the bar and its competitor." Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra
note 50, at 173. Additionally, courts have not considered the implications of the goals they do not
articulate. Q. JOHNTSONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 50, at 173.
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corporations. 54 Courts utilized a rationale based on the personal nature of the
lawyer-client relationship to justify the ban against corporate practice.55 "This
... rationale emphasized the personal qualities brought by lawyers to that rela-
tionship ... and focused directly upon a core issue-the lawyer's professional
independence."'56 That courts relied on statutes to enforce the ban on unauthor-
ized practice, however, did not signify a relinquishing of courts' claims to their
inherent power to monitor and control the practice of law.57
In North Carolina the unauthorized practice of law by corporations is gov-
erned by North Carolina General Statutes sections 84-2.158 and 84-5. 59 Section
84-2.1 defines the practice of law as "performing any legal service for any other
person, firm, or corporation, with or without compensation." 6° Section 84-5
54. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neigh-
bors-or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 187. A very influential law review
article in the early 1930s proclaimed: "Opponents of unauthorized practice of the law consider the
performance of such acts by corporations as even more objectionable than when done by individual
laymen." Hicks & Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Agencies, 41 YALE L.J. 69, 72
(1931).
55. Christensen, supra note 54, at 188.
56. Christensen, supra note 54, at 188. Christensen notes that the arguments of competency
and cost were not effective against corporations practicing law because the corporations were hiring
licensed attorneys to handle legal matters and could provide these services at lower cost. Id. at 188.
The new argument was aptly summarized by Hicks and Katz:
As the corporation is an artificial being, it obviously cannot satisfy the educational and
character requirements for admission to the bar, nor can it take an oath and become an
officer of the court subject to its discipline. As the attorney-client relationship is a purely
personal one, involving mutual trust and confidence, it cannot exist between an attorney
employed by a corporation and a client of the latter. The litigation would be controlled by
the corporation which collected the fee. It seems inevitable that, when the interests of the
corporation and the client happened to conflict, the attorney would deem his primary duty
to be owing to the corporation which employed him, rather than to the client of the corpo-
ration, Whenever presented with the problem, courts have therefore held that corporations
cannot practice law.
Hicks & Katz, supra note 54, at 72; see also In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15
(1910). Courts frequently cite this case as authority when they find corporations guilty of unauthor-
ized practice. The New York court stated:
The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant in a limited and dignified
sense, and it involves the highest trust and confidence. It cannot be delegated without
consent and it cannot exist between an attorney employed by a corporation to practice law
for it, and a client of the corporation, for he would be subject to the directions of the
corporation and not to the directions of the client.... [The attorney's] master would not
be the client but the corporation, conducted it may be wholly by laymen, organized simply
to make money and not to aid in the administration ofjustice which is the highest function
of an attorney and counselor at law .... There would be no remedy by attachment or
disbarment to protect the public from imposition or fraud, no stimulus to good conduct
from the traditions of an ancient and honorable profession, and no guide except the sordid
purpose to earn money for stockholders. The bar, which is an institution of the highest
usefulness and standing, would be degraded if even its humblest member became subject to
the orders of a money-making corporation engaged not in conducting litigation for itself,
but in the business of conducting litigation for others. The degradation of the bar is an
injury to the state.
In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. at 483-84, 92 N.E. at 16.
57. Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HoPSON, supra note 50, at 169. Courts considered statutory regula-
tion of the practice of law to be in aid of inherent judicial power and not a limitation on it. See, eg.,
In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 335-36, 85 A.2d 505, 512 (1951).
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-2.1 (1985).
59. Id. § 84-5.
60. Id. § 84-2.1.
14:28 [Vol. 65
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states: "It shall be unlawful for any corporation to practice law or appear as an
attorney for any person in any court in this state .... "61
Prior to Gardner few North Carolina cases discussed the unauthorized
practice of law by corporations. In State ex rel. Seawell v. Carolina Motor
Club 62 the North Carolina Supreme Court considered whether the acts of de-
fendant motor club in operating a "claim and adjustment" department consti-
tuted a violation of the statutory predecessor to section 84-5.63 These "claim
and adjustment services" 6 were performed "by lay employees and agents of the
club, and in part by attorneys employed, retained and paid by the defendants."
65
The retained attorneys were apparently local practitioners whom the motor club
did not directly employ.6 6 The Seawell court sustained the trial court's conclu-
sion that the offering of services for compensation violated the ban on unauthor-
ized practice by corporations. 67 In its opinion the court espoused a rationale
from a widely quoted New York case that concluded: "A corporation cannot
lawfully practice law. It is a personal right of the individual... [that] cannot be
delegated or assigned .... Since a corporation cannot practice law directly, it
cannot do so indirectly by employing lawyers to practice for it."'68 Defendant
motor club's activity fell within this ban under the Seawell court's broad defini-
tion of the practice of law.69 This definition included:
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, and the management of such actions and proceed-
ings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and, in addition,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and, in
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law. 70
The next North Carolina case involving the unauthorized practice of law by
a corporation was State v. Pledger.71 In Pledger an employee of a corporation
that built homes was convicted of violating section 84-472 for preparing deeds of
61. Id. § 84-5.
62. 209 N.C. 624, 184 S.E. 540 (1936).
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157 (1931); Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina 1955-
Attorneys, 33 N.C.L. Rav. 528 (1955).
64. Seawell, 209 N.C. at 628-30, 184 S.E. at 542-43. The trial court's finding of fact established
that the motor club maintained a "Legal Department and Claim and Adjustment Department." The
club advertised that this department would give advice to members on legal questions, assist in the
collection of damages out of court, and furnish representation to members in criminal cases. Id.
65. Id. at 629, 184 S.E. at 543.
66. See Gardner, 316 N.C. at 292, 341 S.E.2d at 521. The Gardner court acknowledged that
these attorneys were the equivalent of local counsel. Id.
67. Seawell, 209 N.C. at 632, 184 S.E. at 545.
68. Id. at 631, 184 S.E. at 544 (citing In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483, 92 N.E.
15, 16 (1910)).
69. Id. at 632, 184 S.E. at 545.
70. Id. at 631, 184 S.E. at 544 (quoting In re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 189, 65 S.E. 210, 211
(1909)).
71. 257 N.C. 634, 127 S.E.2d 337 (1962).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-4 (1985) states that "[ilt shall be unlawful for any person or associa-
tion of persons, except members of the Bar of the State of North Carolina admitted and licensed to
practice as attorneys-at-law, to appear as attorney or counselor at law in any action or proceeding in
any court in this State .... " Id.
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trust for customers and corporations. The court's inquiry focused on whether
the employee's actions fell within the ban on preparation of documents "for an-
other person, firm, or corporation" by anyone other than members of the Bar.73
The Pledger court reversed defendant's conviction for two reasons. First, the
opinion declared that "[a] person, firm or corporation having a primary interest,
not merely an incidental interest, in a transaction, may prepare legal documents
necessary to the furtherance and completion of a transaction. .. ."74 Second,
the court reasoned that a corporation can act only through its agents. Thus, "[a]
person who... prepares a legal document in connection with a business transac-
tion in which the corporation has a primary interest" does not violate the law
because his or her act constitutes an act of the corporation in furtherance of its
own business. 7"
Code of Professional Responsibility Opinion 326, which instigated Gardner,
was a reconsideration and subsequent reaffirmation of Ethics Opinion 682 and
CPR 19.76 The Bar ruled in Ethics Opinion 68277 that "it would be improper
and unethical" for a member of the bar who is employed full-time by an insur-
ance company as "house counsel" to represent insureds in litigation arising out
of automobile accidents. The opinion cited Seawell as authority for the ruling.
In CPR 1978 the Bar affirmed this same view in the context of an insurance
company's house counsel handling a subrogation claim and possible suit against
a third party. The Bar ruled that because the house counsel would represent the
insured, the insurance company would, in effect, be practicing law.
By challenging the reaffirmation of these two ethics opinions, the petitioners
in Gardner placed squarely before the court the issue of whether the distinction
between house counsel and local counsel warrants a prophylactic rule or
whether the distinction is purely arbitrary. The Gardner court adopted the Bar's
rationale for CPR 326 and found that the proposed practice by petitioners would
73. Pledger, 257 N.C. at 636-37, 127 S.E.2d at 339. The trial court found that defendant had
solicited sales for "shell homes" and that he had prepared deeds of trust for his corporate employer.
Defendant was not a member of the Bar. Id.
74. Id. at 637, 127 S.E.2d at 339. The court noted that all businesses complete documents and
make contracts regularly and that these activities are legal. Id.
75. Id. at 637-38, 127 S.E.2d at 339-40.
76. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 286, 341 S.E.2d at 518. CPR 326 reads in part:
This reconsideration affirms Opinion 682 and CPR 19 and those decisions' premise
that it is unethical to engage in the unauthorized practice of law as proscribed by G.S. 85-5
Protecting and preserving the relationship of the attorney to his client and the court
and avoiding professionally reprehensible conflicts of~interest also prohibit this manner of
legal representation.
The attorney's paramount responsibility is to the court and client which he serves
before the court. This responsibility should not be influenced by any other entity. When
an attorney, who is employed by a corporation, is directed by his employer in the represen-
tation of other individual litigants, he is subject to the direct control of his employer, which
is not itself the litigant and which is not itself subject to strict professional discipline as an
officer of the court. This diluted responsibility to the court and the client must be avoided.
Gardner, 316 N.C. at 288-89, 341 S.E.2d at 519 (quoting N.C. Code of Professional Responsibility
Op. 326 (1986)).
77. See supra note 17.
78. See supra note 18.
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violate the statutory prohibition against corporations practicing law. The em-
ployment of local counsel, however, would not violate the statute because the
court characterized local counsel as an independent contractor and not as an
agent of the insurance company. Thus, the court concluded that CPR 326 was
not based on an arbitrary distinction between house counsel and local counsel.79
This statutory analysis8° relied on the distinction between house and local
counsel, but failed to demonstrate the validity of such a distinction.81 To decide
the case exclusively on statutory grounds, the Gardner court had to find that the
corporation is the actor82 when house counsel represents the insured but that
local counsel is the true actor in the case of retained counsel.8 3 Citing the equa-
tion of house counsel and independent counsel in Seawell,84 petitioners Nation-
wide and Gardner argued that this distinction simply could not exist.85 They
reasoned that if the companies' current practice of hiring outside counsel to rep-
resent insureds did not violate section 84-5,86 then "they [saw] no compelling
reason why they [could not] use salaried attorney-employees to accomplish the
same purpose."87
The Gardner court rejected this argument and distinguished the two types
of representation by examining the "character" of the actor in each practice.8 8
Justice Frye reasoned that the practice in Seawell involved the corporation as
actor regardless of whether the club used house or local counsel. 89 He pro-
nounced that the insurance corporation likewise would be the actor if house
counsel represented the insured. The court "assumed for the purposes of this
opinion" that local counsel used in the current practice would be an independent
contractor. Although acknowledging that the insurance company has "some
control" over an insurance suit, the court found that the independent attorney is
the "actor" who provides legal representation for the insured.90
This reasoning does not provide an adequate distinction between counsel
for two reasons. First, the Gardner court's artificial distinction between the em-
ployment of house counsel and the employment of independent counsel is not
consistent with other authority or with Seawell. Other commentators and courts
have concluded that both the use of house counsel and the use of local counsel
79. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 294, 341 S.E.2d at 523.
80. The court also gave a policy justification. See supra note 49.
81. The trial court could find no distinction between local counsel and house counsel. See
supra note 27 and accompanying text.
82. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 289-90, 341 S.E.2d at 520. The court summarily disposed of this
"first point of inquiry" by citing its holding in Pledger to mean that an employee's acts are the acts of
the corporation. Id.; see supra note 46.
83. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 292-93, 341 S.E.2d at 521-22.
84. Id. at 292, 341 S.E.2d at 521; see Appellee's Brief at 9.
85. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 292, 341 S.E.2d at 521.
86. See id. at 292-93, 341 S.E.2d at 521-22; see also Spencer, The House Counsel and the Unau-
thorized Practice of Law, 33 UNAUTHORIZED PRAc. NEws 20, 23 (1967) ("[Tihe propriety of liabil-
ity insurance companies employing outside counsel to defend a third person assured was questioned
in the past ... ").
87. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 292, 341 S.E.2d at 521; see Appellee's Brief at 9.
88. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 292, 341 S.E.2d at 521-22.
89. Id. at 292, 341 S.E.2d at 522.
90. Id. at 292-93, 341 S.E.2d at 522.
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technically violate the ban on unauthorized practice by corporations. 91 Under
this view, no real distinction exists between the actors; in both cases the attorney
is employed by the insurance company and acts for it.92 The American Bar
Association frankly admits that the practice of permitting local counsel to repre-
sent insureds, although widely permitted, violates this ban.9 3
Similarly, in Seawell the court did not distinguish between the nature of the
actors in announcing its prohibition.94 This prohibition extended to the acts of
local counsel and motor club employees alike.95 The court's opinion did not
restrict this ban to the collection activities at issue in the case.96 To support its
broad ban on the practice of law by corporations, the Seawell court relied on
authorities that either forbade the collection activity of corporations through its
own legal department,97 or prohibited indirect practice by hiring outside firm
attorneys.98 Literature from the same period as the Seawell case supports the
conclusion that the court did not necessarily contemplate a distinction between
the use of house counsel and the use of outside counsel; the permissibility of a
corporation hiring outside counsel to represent other persons was not resolved. 99
91. See Merrick v. American See. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 308 U.S.
625 (1940). In Merrick the court dismissed an argument by the Committee on Supression of Unau-
thorized Practice of Law of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia that a distinction exists
between house counsel and local counsel. The court stated:
Appellants ask us to draw a distinction, at least in respect to probate work, between the
employment of attorney-officers and the employment of outside counsel; ... The question
whether defendant [trust company] is practicing law cannot turn upon it. Defendant is as
free as any corporation to consult its own convenience in selecting and employing attor-
neys. What it may do through one member of the bar it may do through another, if he is
not specially disqualified. The attorney's employment may be sporadic, frequent, or con-
tinuous; it may be performed in and from defendant's offices or other offices; and it may be
paid for by fee or by salary. Salaried attorneys and outside counsel are subject to like
motives and obligations, public and private, and to like public control. Either may be
employed to perform legal services which are properly connected with their employer's
business.
Id, at 277-78; see State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 229, 140 A.2d
863, 868 (1957) ("there is no valid distinction between acts performed . . . through its salaried
employees and the same acts performed through independent, outside counsel"); see also Spencer,
supra note 86, at 25 (briefs of Ohio State Bar Association and Illinois State Bar Association recog-
nize that the use of independent counsel is an exception to the general rule).
92. See State Bar Ass'n v. Conneticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 229, 140 A.2d 863,
868 (1957); In re Rules Governing the Conduct of Attorneys in Florida, 220 So. 2d 6, 7 (Fla. 1969).
93. Spencer, supra note 86, at 24-25.
94. See Seawell, 209 N.C. at 632, 184 S.E. at 545.
95. The Gardner court acknowledged that the acts of either were prohibited. The court stated:
"Petitioners quite correctly state that the Court made no distinctions between the two methods in
forbidding defendants' activities." Gardner, 316 N.C. at 292, 341 S.E.2d at 521.
96. See Seawell, 299 N.C. at 632, 184 S.E. at 544-45.
97. See, eg., State v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S.W.2d 918 (1931).
98. See, eg., State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchant's Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 P. 694
(1919).
99. See, eg., Hicks & Katz, supra note 54, at 93-94. Hicks and Katz noted that insurance
contracts "appear to be an agreement by a corporation to furnish attorneys to third parties, a service
which in other connections has been held to constitute illegal practice of the law." Id. at 93. After
discussing the arguments for and against insurance companies that furnish attorneys, the Article
speculated that courts would uphold "the contention of insurance companies that they are merely
protecting their own interests when they furnish the insured with counsel." Id. at 93. The Article
noted, however, that courts disagree over the situations in which an insurance company could fur-
nish an attorney. Id. at 93-94.
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The Gardner court's distinction between the current practice and the Seawell
ban is, therefore, not convincing.
Second, the Gardner court's reasoning that the characters of the actors in
each practice are distinguishable rests on the court's assumption that local coun-
sel is an independent contractor. 1°° The outside lawyer traditionally has been
viewed as an independent contractor. 0 1 Nevertheless, the current status of the
relationship between insurer and local counsel may not justify this distinction
between the actors.
The Gardner court characterized the employment of local counsel as the
fulfillment of an agreement to furnish a defense to the insured; however, the
insurance contract gives the company the right to control that defense.' 0 2 This
control is of two types. First, the insurer has final authority over any settlement
and can agree or refuse to settle in keeping with its interests.' 0 3 Second, the
insurer can exert control over the local counsel's trial preparation. 14 This con-
trol extends to discovery matters, including the taking of depositions.' 0 5 One
commentator has noted a current trend of insurers to "limit defense costs by
exercising greater control over defense counsel's preparation and expenses.' 0 6
In North Carolina the accepted test for determining if an employer-independent
contractor relationship exists is "whether the party for whom the work is being
done has the right to control the worker with respect to the manner or method of
doing work."' 0 7 Thus, given the established test for independent contractor sta-
tus, the character of the local counsel may not be distinguishable from house
counsel.
Also central to the Gardner court's analysis was its examination of whether
section 84-5 of the North Carolina General Statutes would prohibit an appear-
ance by the corporation through its employees.' 0 8 Petitioners Gardner and Na-
tionwide argued that Gardner's appearance as in-house counsel was not
prohibited because the corporation would, in essence, be acting for itself' 0 9
This argument relied in part on the supreme court's holding in Pledger. As in
100. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 292-93, 441 S.E.2d at 522.
101. See W. SEAVEY, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 84, at 145 (1964).
102. Traders and Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621, 626 (10th Cir. 1942)
(insurer's obligation to pay is primary and paramount; consequently its right to control the litigation
is first and paramount); see also Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67
HARV. L. REv. 1136, 1137 (1954) (most insurance policies unambiguously give the insurer the right
to control defense of claims under the policy).
103. Powe v. Odell, 312 N.C. 410, 413 n.3, 322 S.E.2d 762, 764 n.3 (1984); Alford v. Textile Ins.
Co., 248 N.C. 224, 229, 103 S..2d 8, 12 (1958).
104. Cooney, The Perils of Defense Counsel's Relinquishment of Control Over Preparation of the
Defense to Insurer, 52 INS. COuNs. J. 259, 259 (1985). Cooney states: "Enormous pressures, either
express or implied, can be exerted on defense counsel by an insurance company to forego or delay
proper preparation." Id.; see Underwood, The Doctor and His Lawyer: Conflicts of Interest, 30 U.
KAN. L. REV. 385 (1982); Report and Recommendations for the Most Efficient Use of the Legal
Effort, 30 INS. CouNs. J. 519, 519 (1963).
105. Cooney, supra note 104, at 260.
106. Cooney, supra note 104, at 259.
107. Page v. Sloan, 12 N.C. App. 433, 439, 183 S.E.2d 813, 817 (1971) (emphasis added), aff'd,
281 N.C. 697, 190 S.E.2d 189 (1972).
108. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 290-91, 341 S.E.2d at 520-21.
109. Id.
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Pledger, Gardner and Nationwide cited the "primary interest" of the insurance
company as justification for house counsel's representation of insureds.1 0 The
court rejected this reliance on Pledger 1 11 and pronounced that under Nation-
wide's proposal, the insurance company "would be appearing as an attorney for
someone else" in violation of section 84-5.112
This conclusion merits closer examination in light of the realities of insur-
ance defense. The Gardner court's narrow analysis focused on only two features
of the relationship between insurer and insured. First, the court noted that the
insured-not the insurance company-is the party who is named in any suit and
against whom a judgment could be entered. 113 Second, the identity of the in-
surer and the insured are distinct because their interests do not coincide when
the insured faces liability in excess of the coverage. 1 14 From this analysis the
court surmised that the corporation would not be representing itself but rather a
"person." 115 This conclusive distinction 1 6 between insurer and insured proves
crucial because a corporation apparently would not engage in the unauthorized
practice of law if it represented itself in litigation through house counsel. 117
Other courts and commentators have advanced different and more detailed
analyses of the party in interest when the insurer has a contractual duty to de-
fend. First, actual divergence of interests between insurer and insured may be
the exception rather than the rule. As a practical matter, this divergence of
interest between insurer and insured due to excess exposure occurs in settlement
considerations, when claims create exposure in excess of policy limits. 118 If
there is exposure in excess of the insured's policy, the risk of not settling falls on
the insured because "the insured will face an uninsured exposure should an ef-
fort to defend or minimize damage fail.""19 Usually, however, the goals of in-
surer and insured coincide because each wishes to minimize costs. 20
Furthermore, as one commentator has observed,
110. Id.
111. The court's rejection of the interest argument based on Pledger was correct. Pledger was
charged with violating N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-4, not § 854. Pledger, 257 N.C. at 636, 127 S.E.2d at
339. The emphasis in the case concerned whether Pledger was personally liable even though he
acted as an agent of the corporation. Id. at 637-38, 127 S.E.2d at 339-40.
112. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 291, 341 S.E.2d at 521.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. A corporation representing a person would violate the general ban announced in
Seawell. Seawell, 209 N.C. at 630, 184 S.E. at 544.
116. The court apparently adopted the position of the Bar. See Appellant's Brief at 11. Neither
the court nor the Bar cited authority on this point.
117. In its brief the Bar noted that in North Carolina no authority states that a corporation may
represent itself in court through house counsel. The Bar assumed, however, that Pledger stands for
the proposition that a corporation may represent itself. Id. at 14; see also N.C. Code of Professional
Responsibility Op. 326 (1986) (the proposed practice would be unethical unless the insurance com-
pany defended a claim in its name only).
118. See Mallen, supra note 3, at 118; Cooney, supra note 104, at 259.
119. Mallen, supra note 3, at 118. The only risk-free alternative for the insured is to settle, and
this option may not be financially attractive to the insurer. Mallen, supra note 3, at 118.
120. Cooney, supra note 104, at 259; Mallen, Insurance Counsel: The Fine Line Between Profes-
sional Responsibility and Malpractice, 45 INs. COONS. .1. 244, 252 (1978) ("Dual representation by
insurance defense counsel is usually harmonious and equally beneficial to both insurer and insured
since they share the same goals ....").
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the reality of the excess exposure resides only in the imagination of the
pleader. It is almost unheard of for a personal injury claimant to plead
a sum constituting the damages which corresponds to the actual loss or
that sum truly desired for settlement. Too often the damage claims are
so inflated as to be ludicrous.1 2 1
Finally, even when the insured risks excess exposure, the interposition of the
insurance company's interest will guarantee a vigorous defense.1 22
Second, some courts and the American Bar Association approach the issue
of the interests of the parties from a functional perspective. Under this analysis
of the undertakings of insured, insurer, and attorney, a recognizable community
of interest characterizes the relationship.12 3 Viewed in this manner, "the com-
pany and the insured are virtually one in their common interest. 124
Third, several courts have noted that although the insurance company is
not technically a party to the suit, the insurer's interest and the nature of the
contractual duty to defend place the practice proposed by Nationwide and other
insurers outside of the ban on unauthorized practice. 125 Under this analysis, the
financial state of the insurance company and the burden of carrying defense
costs entitles it to defend using its own attorney.' 26 The ban is not violated
because the insurance company fulfills a contractual obligation, as opposed to
conducting a general law practice 127 or furnishing legal services to a member of
its organization.' 2 8
The Gardner court's simple statutory analysis, although technically correct,
summarily dismissed petitioners' argument and ignored numerous instances in
which the insurer alone bears the costs of defense and any loss.' 29 The court
quite correctly noted that section 84-5 differs from statutes found in many juris-
dictions that permit house counsel to defend insureds. 130 The absence of a statu-
tory exception, however, did not prohibit the court from defining the interests of
121. Mallen, supra note 3, at 118; see, e.g., Parker v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 109 Misc. 2d 678,440
N.Y.S.2d 964 (1981) (punitive damage claims routinely tacked on to ad damnum clauses).
122. 0' Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 799, 167 P.2d 483, 486 (1946).
123. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 282 (1950). The ABA Ethics Committee
stated: "[I]t is evident at the outset that a community of interest exists between the company and
the insured growing out of the contract of insurance ...." See also American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579, 592, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 571 (1974) (insurer, insured, and
attorney may be viewed as loose partnership, alliance, or coalition sharing a common purpose).
124. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 282 (1950). Based on this common inter-
est analysis, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics ruled that an attorney, employed by an
insurance company on a salaried basis, may defend lawsuits against insureds on behalf of the insur-
ance company. Id. Although noting that the ABA opinion was "entitled to respect," the Gardner
court declined to follow it. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 293-94, 341 S.E.2d at 522-23.
125. In re Rules Governing the Conduct of Attorneys in Florida, 220 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1969);
Coscia v. Cnningham, 250 Ga. 521, 524, 299 S.E.2d 880, 882-83 (1983).
126. In re Rules Governing the Conduct of Attorneys in Florida, 220 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1969).
127. Coscia, 250 Ga. at 524, 299 S.E.2d at 883.
128. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court, therefore, would distinguish between Nationwide's pro-
posed practice and the fact pattern of Seawell in which the general ban on unauthorized practice was
announced.
129. Unless the insurer asserts a reason to deny coverage, if the ad damnum clause is equal to or
below the policy limit the risk will be the insurer's alone. See Appellant's Brief at 17-18.
130. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 293, 341 S.E.2d at 522.
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the insured and insurer as identical, especially in those cases in which the in-
sured risks no excess exposure problem.1 31 The court's literal definition of the
represented interest oversimplifies a complex problem that deserves more careful
attention.
The ethical issues that the court declined to address could provide a more
plausible, although inconclusive, basis for distinguishing the use of local counsel
from house counsel.1 32 Attempts to distinguish the types of representation in-
volve the ability of house counsel to ethically represent an insured 133 in the face
of conflicts of interest endemic to insurance defense.' 34 These conflicts of inter-
est were catalogued in CPR 326,135 but are typified by conflicts surrounding
settlement in instances of possible liability beyond policy limits136 and by cover-
age issues. 137 Although the Bar recognized that these conflicts apply to local
counsel as well as house counsel, 138 it claimed that house counsel may occupy a
position in which it cannot behave ethically.
These issues of ethical behavior arise under two ethical canons, 13 9 Canon
5140 and Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.14 1 Canon 5
prescribes as follows: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Judgement on
131. Although the Bar's authority to establish rules of professional conduct and ethics is said to
be co-extensive and co-equal with the supreme court's power to regulate its attorneys, see supra note
21, the possibility remains that the court has retained sufficient authority to rule on the permissibility
of representation by house counsel. In Gardner the court was careful to note that the general assem-
bly had expressly stated in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-36 that by empowering the Bar it did not intend to
abridge or disable the court's "inherent power to deal with its attorneys." Gardner, 316 N.C. at 287-
88, 341 S.E.2d at 519. Additionally, the court noted that this case was "of sufficient importance" to
warrant consideration. Id. at 288, 341 S.E.2d at 519. Thus, the court's rationale for the holding,
deference to the legislature, seems disingenuous. After examining the substantive issues involved,
the court could have chosen to uphold the superior court or modify the ruling to strike a compro-
mise.
One possible solution appears in ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 282 (1950).
Under this opinion house counsel can represent the insured when the ad damnum is within the
policy limit. Id.; see also Locke & Austin, Handling the Excess Coverage Situation for the Insurer, 36
INS. COUNS. J. 60 (1969) (advocating the use of independent counsel in situations when the claim
exceeds the policy limit).
132. Most of the attention in both appellant's and appellee's briefs was devoted to the conflicts of
interest issue.
133. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 288-89, 341 S.E.2d at 519.
134. Appellant's Brief at 16.
135. "These conflicts include areas of case liability, evaluation, compulsory counterclaims by the
insured, economics of the defense of the case and policy coverage and confidential disclosures."
N.C. Code of Professional Responsibility Op. 326 (1980).
136. Appellant's Brief at 17; see Locke & Austin, supra note 131, at 64; Note, Conflicts of Inter-
est, 13 GA. L. REV. 973, 987 (1979).
137. Appellant's Brief at 17; see Note, supra note 136, at 1007.
138. See Appellant's Brief at 16-17; Mallen, supra note 120, at 244-45.
139. Subsequent to arguments before the North Carolina Supreme Court, the N.C. Bar Council
adopted the NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1985) [hereinafter RULES OF
CONDUCT]. The RULES OF CONDUCT superceded the NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1981) [hereinafter N.C. CODE], which was based on the ABA MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. Because Gardner was briefed and argued before the Bar Council
adopted the RULES OF CONDUCT, this Note refers to the N.C. CODE in its discussion of ethical
opinions. Canons IV and V of the RULES OF CONDUCT embody the same standards for professional
conduct as the Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules discussed in this Note.
140. Cooney, supra note 104, at 262.




Behalf of a Client." 142 This canon and its disciplinary rules require a lawyer to
exercise professional judgment solely for the client and free of compromising
influences. 143 If this is not possible a lawyer must decline1'44 or discontinue em-
ployment.1 45 Most important for insurance defense, a lawyer may represent
multiple clients if the lawyer "can adequately represent the interests of each and
if each consents to the representation after full disclosure."1 46 Settlement con-
siderations in situations of possible excess exposure create conflicts that require
defense counsel to balance the rights and liabilities of both the insurer and the
insured. 147
Canon 4 states that a lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of
a client. 148 Under Ethical Consideration 4-5, a lawyer may not "use informa-
tion acquired in the course of representation of a client to the disadvantage of a
client." 149 Furthermore, the lawyer cannot knowingly reveal a confidence. 150
Ethical conflicts can arise when the attorney learns information from the insured
"that indicates that the policy does not cover the claim or that a policy defense
exists that the insurer could use to avoid coverage." 15 1
Following CPR 326 the Bar argued that house counsel could not act ethi-
cally in the face of these conflicts for two reasons. First, due to house counsel's
position as employee of the insurance company, counsel could not exercise the
independent judgment necessary to identify potential or actual conflicts and
responsibly manage them.1 52 Second, as an agent of the company, house coun-
sel could not maintain the confidentiality of an insured, especially in coverage
issues. 153
142. N.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1981).
143. Id. EC 5-1.
144. Id. DR 5-105(A).
145. Id. DR 5-105(B).
146. Id. DR 5-105(C).
147. Locke & Austin, supra note 131, at 61.
148. N.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4 (1981).
149. Id. EC 4-5.
150. Id. DR 4-101(B).
151. Note, supra note 136, at 1007. These situations will be referred to collectively as "coverage
issues." "The Code of Professional Responsibility imposes a broad fiduciary duty upon an attorney
not to use information acquired in the course of representation to the disadvantage of his client."
Note, supra note 136, at 1006. If the insured divulges confidential information to the attorney which
indicates that the policy may not cover the claim, the attorney may not disclose the privileged infor-
mation to the insurer. Note, supra note 136, at 1007-08.
152. Appellant's Brief at 16; see N.C. Code of Professional Responsibility Op. 326 (1986).
153. Appellant's Brief at 16. A typical coverage issue would arise when the insured relates facts
to the attorney that would allow the insurer to deny coverage under the terms of the policy. Mallen
describes the duty of counsel when given confidential information concerning a possible coverage
issue:
Where the attorney selected by the company to defend a claim or suit becomes aware
of facts or information, imparted to him by the insured under circumstances indicating the
insured's belief that such disclosure would not be revealed to the insurance company but
would be treated as a confidential communication to the attorney, which indicated to the
attorney a lack of coverage, then as to such matters, disclosures made directly to the attor-
ney, should not be revealed to the company by the attorney nor should the attorney discuss
with the insured the legal significance of the disclosure or the nature of the coverage
question.
Mallen, supra note 120, at 247.
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Commentators have noted the problems that arise when house counsel at-
tempts to manage conflicts of interest. Responsibilities placed on house counsel
to properly respond to the needs of employer and insured have been described as
onerous.154 Difficulty recognizing conflicts of interest may result from a subjec-
tive bias in favor of the insurer.155 Control of insurance defense ultimately lies
with a house counsel's superiors, who may pressure the attorney to act in the
company's interest.156 Furthermore, house counsel may be concerned that the
insurer will be dissatisfied if he or she employs a course of action detrimental to
the company's economic interests because of perceived ethical obligations.157
Although these conflicts present serious ethical problems for local counsel as
well, 158 the rationale underlying CPR 326 is that the employee relationship of
house counsel creates such a tremendous risk that a prophylactic rule is
justified.159
Not all courts and commentators agree with this ethical analysis, which
characterizes house counsel as a corporate agent caught in a situation that pre-
vents ethical behavior. The Florida Supreme Court rejected a nearly identical
proposal to CPR 326160 on the grounds that it "merely discriminates against a
154. Coscia v. Cunningham, 250 Ga. 521, 524, 299 S.E.2d 880, 883 (1983).
155. Mallen, supra note 3, at 109. Mallen notes that conflicts of interest have both objective and
subjective components. Favoritism to the interests of an insurer, whether deliberate or subconscious,
constitutes a breach of ethical rules and fiduciary obligations. Id. at 109-110. The pressure that an
insurance company can exert on house counsel was illustrated by an article in the National Law
Journal on November 26, 1984. This article reported a California ease in which house counsel filed
suit against an insurance company claiming he was wrongfully discharged for refusing to participate
in the company's "aggressive policy of unethical claims practices." The attorney alleged he was fired
after he disobeyed the company's orders not to tell two policyholders that plaintiffs had made settle-
ment offers within the policy limits. The jury awarded house counsel $250,000. Galante, In-House
Attorney Wins $250,000for WrongfulDischarge, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 26, 1984, at 8. Although this case
could be viewed as evidence of the onerous pressure on house counsel to favor their employers, an
alternative conclusion is possible. Such cases may serve as notice to insurance companies desiring
the economic advantages of house counsel representation that they must allow house counsel to
behave ethically or face possible civil penalties from the employee as well as from the insured.
156. This argument ignores, however, the duty imposed on the insurer to carry out the insurance
contract in good faith. Alford v. Textile Ins. Co., 248 N.C. 224, 229, 103 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1958)
("[C]ourts have consistently held that an insurer owes a duty to its insured to act deligently [sic] and
in good faith in effecting settlements within policy limits. .. ."). If insurance companies pressure
house counsel to behave unethically, they risk assertions of bad faith by the insured.
157. Mallen, supra note 3, at 111. In response to petitioner's argument that house counsel would
behave ethically by adherence to the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Bar stated:
Such an assumption ignores the fact that such conflicts, particularly in the area of defense
economics, are often difficult to perceive. This difficulty would doubtless be exaggerated
for an attorney with a long-term institutional bias in favor of his corporate employer,
which happens to be potentially adverse to his primary client.
Appellant's Brief at 24.
158. In re Rules Governing the Conduct of Attorneys in Florida, 220 So. 2d 6, 7 (Fla. 1969); see
supra note 32.
159. Amicus Brief for the North Carolina Bar Association at 32.
160. In re Rules Governing the Conduct of Attorneys in Florida, 220 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1969). The
Florida Bar proposed an addition to their rules aimed primarily at "the practice of certain major
insurance companies to maintain full time employed counsel who also represent policy holders." Id.
at 7. The Florida Bar noted possible conflicts between insurer and insured when claims exceeded
coverage and in compromise settlement negotiations. The Bar insisted that the "pressure of retain-
ing one's full time means of livelihood" precluded the possibility that house counsel could give un-
adulterated devotion to divergent interests. Id. The Florida court rejected the proposal that only
local counsel could handle these situations and upheld the use of house counsel. Id.
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class with no reasonable basis for distinction." 16 1 The court reasoned that the
ethical problem might well arise regardless of the nature of the employment
between the insurance company and the lawyer.162 Courts that find house coun-
sel to be equally loyal to clients perceive these attorneys as members of the bar
governed as all others by the Code of Professional Responsibility. 163 Differen-
tial treatment between the two types of counsel may serve to establish a "double
standard of ethics"'16 4 between two groups within the same bar. This situation is
troubling because all members of the bar are subjected to the same background
scrutiny and examination concerning professional responsibility.
165
The Code of Professional Responsibility offers guidance to attorneys who
handle conflicts of interest as they arise in a typical insurance case. When the
interests of insurer and the insured diverge after a lawyer has undertaken repre-
sentation, such as in the context of a settlement negotiation, the attorney must
disclose these conflicts to the insured and advise the insured of his or her ability
to obtain independent counsel. 166 Local counsel has used this disclosure re-
quirement as a method for maintaining ethical behavior. It appears that disclo-
sure and advice of rights requirements would similarly protect the interests of
insureds who are represented by house counsel. Such an assumption rests, how-
ever, on a belief that house counsel would not be unduly influenced by subjective
biases arising from the employment situation itself.
Coverage issues present more complex and troubling questions concerning
the possible limitations on the ability of house counsel to handle ethical
problems. In conflicts surrounding coverage issues, the insured's counsel pos-
sesses confidential information that may be adverse to the interests of both in-
surer and insured. 167 When this situation arises the only acceptable solution is
for the attorney who possesses the harmful information to withdraw from the
case.16 8 Even assuming that house counsel could behave ethically in most other
situations, it would be a formidable task for counsel either to withdraw from the
case or to refrain from divulging information to his or her employer.' 69
161. Id.
162. Id. The court stated: "The ultimate problem is the same. There may come a time when
the lawyer must decide which of two masters he will continue to serve .... " Id.; see also Murach v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 184, 189, 158 N.E.2d 338, 342 (1959) (because of the
interest of the insurance company in the outcome, local counsel is no more removed than house
counsel).
163. See Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 625 (1940); Coscia v. Cunningham, 250 Ga. 521, 299 S.E.2d 880 (1983); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1958).
164. In re Rules Governing the Conduct of Attorneys in Florida, 220 So. 2d 6, 8-9 (Fla. 1969).
165. THE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, RULES Gov-
ERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA §§ .0600,
.0900 (Sept. 19, 1985).
166. See N.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBsLrrY EC 5-16 (1981). When an attorney is
initially hired by an insurance company to represent an insured, it is the duty of the company to
advise insureds of their right to obtain their own counsel. Id.
167. See Mallen, supra note 3, at 108, 112; Note, supra note 136, at 1005.
168. See Note, supra note 136, at 1005.
169. A suggestion has been made, however, that a properly planned legal department could
insulate an attorney from these forces. Mallen, supra note 3, at 111. Mallen suggests, for example,
that a staff counsel department could be "designated to achieve an independence comparable to that
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Analysis of the ethical issues surrounding the use of house counsel suggests
a more substantive process for determining the validity of CPR 326 than the
strict statutory analysis test on which the Gardner court relied. Although the
court alluded to possible conflicts of interest issues in its decision, by basing its
decision entirely on statutory grounds the court engaged in a superficial assess-
ment of the question before it. A thorough assessment of the Bar's claim of the
need for a prophylactic rule would have obliged the court to identify and balance
the interests of insurance companies, the public, and the Bar. Through this bal-
ancing the court could have determined whether a limited exception to the un-
authorized practice ban would benefit the public or constitute a reasonable
practice by insurance companies.
Even assuming that a strict statutory analysis is a reasonable basis for de-
ciding this case, the court's superficial treatment of the challenge to CPR 326
fails to address satisfactorily the lower court's finding that this ethics opinion
draws an arbitrary distinction between local and house counsel. The Gardner
decision comes during a time of growing concern over the costs of liability insur-
ance. The court's failure to justify the Bar's ruling on more plausible grounds
leaves both the court and the Bar open to inferences that they exalted interests of
one segment of the Bar over the public interest.
WILLIAM KINSLAND EDWARDS
of outside counsel." Id. at 112. This department would be totally separate "with lines of supervision
and control [originating with] senior lawyers, not claims persons." Id. at 112. The responsibility for
employment review and promotion should be maintained within the department. In short, "the
exercise of professional judgment must remain with the staff counsel, not the company." Id. at 112.
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